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Commitment Decisions in EU Competition Enforcement:  
Policy Effectiveness v. the Formal Rule of Law 
 
Ryan R. Stones 
 
(Accepted for publication in volume 38 Yearbook of European Law (2019))  
 
Abstract 
 
Marking the fifteenth anniversary of the entry into force of Regulation 1/2003, 2019 offers a vantage point from 
which to analyse the rise of commitment decisions as the primary enforcement mechanism for non-cartel 
competition law investigations at EU level. Commitment decisions, the closure of competition cases with a 
package of remedial obligations in response to Commission concerns, have an undeniable administrative 
appeal. They afford the Commission the absolute discretion to counteract any form of market conduct, whether 
beyond the pre-existing scope of the law deduced by the EU Courts from Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, or below 
exacting thresholds for prohibition of legally controversial business practices. Furthermore, the Commission 
can secure any remedial outcome, even if disproportionate or seemingly disconnected from its competitive 
concerns, to thereby redraw markets according to its idealized vision. In this regard, commitment decisions 
allow the Commission to achieve its policy goals with utmost effectiveness. Nevertheless, this article argues that 
such a method of market intervention represents a significant divergence from realizing the ideal of the formal 
rule of law in EU competition enforcement: normative certainty for businesses, facilitated by the equal 
application of generalized legal norms, which are subject to close oversight by courts. This offers an 
aspirational legal form of considerable political and economic value. Using commitment decisions to enforce 
EU competition policy via ad hoc, subject-specific decision-making, conditional upon unforeseeable remedial 
obligations, is of systemic detriment to the legal comprehensibility of not just future Commission decision-
making, but the entire edifice of norms deduced from the Treaties by the EU Courts in this field. A rather 
relaxed approach to judicially reviewing the remedial proportionality of commitment decisions has partly 
contributed to this issue. However it is suggested that the EU Courts are largely unable to remedy the problems 
of novel theories or harm or subject-specific determinations, delivering upon their important residual role 
envisaged by the rule of law ideal, because of a factor mostly beyond their control: the lack of commitment 
decisions brought before them for review. To that end, the article concludes by recommending the automatic 
review of commitment decisions by the Courts. This would hopefully foster a more balanced reconciliation of 
effective policy achievement by the Commission and realization of the formal rule of law ideal in contemporary 
EU competition enforcement.     
1. Introduction 
The 1st May 2019 marked fifteen years since the entry into force of Regulation 1/2003.1 Informally 
referred to as the “Modernization Regulation”, it fundamentally altered the division of labour for EU 
competition law enforcement between the European Commission and Member State decision-makers 
(national competition authorities, courts) that had existed since the 1960s.2 Among its numerous 
procedural alterations, Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 gave the Commission a power to close 
investigations with a commitment decision, whereby businesses submit remedial packages addressing 
its preliminary competition concerns.3 This allows for the avoidance of a fully-substantiated finding 
of illegality and a fine, the typical outcome of a prohibition decision.4 Since their first use in 2005,5 
commitment decisions have become the Commission’s mechanism of choice for concluding non-
cartel investigations pursuant to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.6 This has continued in earnest in recent 
years, with landmark commitment decisions recently agreed in Amazon, Gazprom, and Pay-TV.7 
                                                     
 Lecturer in Law at City, University of London. Contact: ryan.stones@city.ac.uk.  
1 Regulation 1/2003, O.J. 2003, L 1/1. 
2 Regulation 17/62, J.O 1962, P 13/204. 
3 Art 9., Reg. 1/2003. 
4 Art 7., ibid.. 
5 Joint Selling of the Media Rights to the German Bundesliga (COMP/C-2/37.214). 
6 For statistics: Wils, “Ten Years of Commitment Decisions under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003: Too Much of a Good 
Thing?”, (2015) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2617580>, (last visited 30 October 2019); Geradin 
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It is clear that even prior to Regulation 1/2003, the Commission routinely sought to secure 
remedial commitments from businesses rather than proceeding to a full decision.8 Pre-2004, it often 
granted formal Article 101(3) TFEU exemption decisions in response to notified agreements subject 
to conditions.9 There are also notable instances of abuse of dominance investigations pursuant to 
Article 102 TFEU concluding with an “undertaking” from a business that it would change its 
commercial behaviour.10 These were undoubtedly powerful enforcement tools.11 The introduction of 
commitment decisions as part of the procedural modernization of EU enforcement was in certain 
ways an improvement over the negotiated outcomes of old. In terms of transparency, Article 9 now 
provides a clear legal basis for their adoption for Article 102 TFEU, and they are subjected to market 
testing through provisional publication in the Official Journal.12 With regard to compliance, there is 
now a formal procedure for sanctioning breaches of commitments undertaken.13 
While acknowledging such precedents, since Regulation 1/2003 the Commission has 
demonstrated a clear preference for concluding non-cartel investigations with Article 9 commitment 
decisions rather than Article 7 prohibitions. The typical justification offered by the Commission for 
their frequency is procedural economy: that the concession of defence rights allows for the swift 
securing of competitive conditions on the investigated market, more quickly bringing the problematic 
conduct to an end.14 This is said to make commitment decisions particularly appealing in technology 
markets.15 It could also be suggested that the relative mildness of the conduct subjected to this 
procedure justifies its use, simultaneously conserving Commission resources to pursue the most 
heinous behaviour with fully-substantiated prohibition decisions, primarily cartels.16 But none of these 
explanations are especially convincing. There is little to suggest that commitment decisions are on 
average much faster to conclude,17 nor optimally suited to technology markets.18 Furthermore, the 
legal innocuousness of their subject-matter is challenged by examples of commitment decisions 
                                                                                                                                                                     
and Mattioli, “The Transactionalization of EU Competition Law: A Positive Development?”, 8 JECLAP (2017), 634-643; 
Ibáñez Colomo, The Shaping of EU Competition Law, (CUP, 2018), pp. 289.  
7 E-book MFNS and Related Matters (AT.40153) (hereafter “Amazon”); Upstream Gas Supplies in Central and Eastern 
Europe (AT.39816) (hereafter “Gazprom”); Cross-Border Access to Pay-TV (AT.40023) (hereafter “Pay-TV”) (commitment 
decisions with Paramount on 26 July 2016 and other undertakings concerned on 7 March 2019).  
8 Van Bael, “The Antitrust Settlement Practice of the EC Commission”, 23(1) CML Rev. (1986), 61-90; Waelbroeck, “New 
Forms of Settlement of Antitrust Cases and Procedural Safeguards: Is Regulation 17 Falling into Abeyance?”, 11(4) EL Rev. 
(1986), 268-280. 
9 E.g. Optical Fibres (IV/30.320), 1986 O.J. L 236/30; UIP (IV/30.566), 1989 O.J. L 226/25. 
10 E.g. “Averting the Danger of an Abuse of Dominant Position: The IBM Case”, 17(7/8) Bulletin of the European 
Communities (1984), 7; Twenty-Seventh Report on Competition Policy 1997 (Brussels, 1998), pp. 26-27 (La Poste/SWIFT 
and Digital), pp. 144-148 (IRI/Nielsen). 
11 Conditional exemption decisions were used in the 1990s vis-à-vis network operators to pre-empt EU legislation on 
telecommunications liberalization: Larouche, Competition Law and Regulation in European Telecommunications, (Hart, 
2000); Cave and Crowther, “Pre-Emptive Competition Policy Meets Regulatory Anti-Trust”, 26(9) ECLR (2005), 481-490. 
12 Art. 27(4), Regulation 1/2003. 
13 Art 23(2)(c), ibid., as used in Microsoft (Tying) (AT.39530) to levy a €561 million fine. For criticism: Aleixo, “An 
Inaugural Fine: Microsoft’s Failure to Comply with Commitments (case COMP/39530)”, 34(9) ECLR (2013), 466-479. 
Although exemption decisions could previously be revoked, censuring non-compliance with Article 102 undertakings 
required the initiation of formal infringement proceedings.  
14 E.g. COM(2009)206, “Report on the Functioning of Regulation 1/2003”, 5; SPEECH/13/768, “The Google Antitrust 
Case: What is at Stake?” (commitments “solve competition concerns more quickly and concretely, with an immediate impact 
on the market”); COM(2014)453, “Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003: Achievements and Future 
Perspectives”, 7. 
15 E.g. SPEECH/12/372, “Statement of VP Almunia on the Google antitrust investigation’ (on “fast moving markets” 
particularly benefitting from commitments); Commission Report 2014, ibid..  
16 As seemingly envisaged by Recital 13, Reg. 1/2003. See SEC(2009)574, “Report on the Functioning of Regulation 
1/2003”, 33. 
17 For calculations questioning their speed: Lugard and Möllmann, “The European Commission’s Practice Under Article 9 
Regulation 1/2003: A Commitment a Day Keeps the Court Away?”, (2013) CPI Antitrust Chronicle; Mariniello, 
“Commitments or Prohibition? The EU Antitrust Dilemma”, 2014/01 Bruegel Policy Brief (2014). The most rapid 
commitment decisions have been preceded by informal discussions, e.g. DE/DK Interconnector (AT.40461) (around 6 
months from initiation to conclusion). 
18 Lugard and Möllmann, ibid. (tech commitments among the slowest); Mariniello, ibid. 5 (24% of commitments involved 
technology versus 61% of prohibition decisions).  
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concerning conduct akin to a hub-and-spoke cartel and exchanging information on future price 
increases.19 
Reflecting upon over a decade of enforcement since Regulation 1/2003, this article offers an 
alternative justification for the Commission’s procedural preference. Commitment decisions represent 
the most powerful tool conceivable for the realization of the Commission’s policy goals with 
maximum effectiveness. Such efficacy results from commitment decisions constituting the 
enforcement of competition policy through pure, unrestrained administrative discretion. It will be 
demonstrated (section 2) that the Commission is able to secure changes to any type of business 
conduct, even if stretching the pre-existing normative scope of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (beyond 
the law), or without reaching exacting legal thresholds deduced by the Courts for condemnation 
(below the law). The appealing policy effectiveness of commitment decisions also relates to their 
outcomes (section 3). The Commission is able to negotiate any remedial package with investigated 
firms, even if the outcomes are entirely unrelated to the initial competitive concerns. In essence, 
commitment decisions afford the discretion for the Commission to sanction any conduct it dislikes 
and redraw markets according to its idealized vision with maximum effectiveness. 
But having acknowledged the efficacious pursuit of often laudable policy ends, the main 
purpose of this article is to explore the problematic consequences of this means of market 
intervention. In short, the prioritization of effective policy goals through unbridled administrative 
discretion represents a rejection of the formal rule of law ideal in EU competition enforcement. While 
others have previously raised analogous concerns about commitment decisions,20 this article builds 
upon their important insights by squarely adopting legal theory as a lens through which to more 
extensively scrutinize the implications of this manner of competition enforcement, while also 
incorporating analysis of the many decisions adopted since their earlier writing. A theoretical 
interlude (section 4) sketches the political and economic value of aspiring towards generalized and 
equally-applicable legal norms, comprehensible to businesses and scrutinized by courts, justifying its 
inclusion amongst the foundational values of the EU.21 This will lay the groundwork for an extensive 
articulation of the negative implications of the significant contemporary divergence from realizing the 
formal rule of law (section 5). It will be explained how each appealing element of commitment 
decisions for the Commission (e.g. novel theories of harm, ad hoc legal exceptions, inconsistent and 
disconnected remedies) have come together to systematically degrade the legal certainty and 
universality of every pre-existing norm of EU competition law.       
To be clear, despite the problematic consequences of this form of enforcement, it is actually 
to be expected: administrative authorities understandably endeavour – perhaps are expected to 
endeavour - to realize their policy goals as effectively as possible. So long as external review 
mechanisms can generalize the specific and concretize the unclear within individual administrative 
decisions, the value of the formal rule of law may nevertheless be approximated. Indeed, that is the 
institutional architecture seemingly mandated by the EU Treaties for competition policy, where the 
Commission takes the discretionary decisional lead in enforcing Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, and the 
Courts occasionally review their legality. To that end, the final part of this article will explore the 
culpability of EU Courts in the systemic degradation in the rule of law occasioned by the rise of 
commitment decisions (section 6). Contrary to other accounts, it will be suggested that judicial fault is 
not clear cut here. On the one hand, certain rulings do indicate a level of deference. But on the other 
hand, there are significant obstacles largely outside of the Courts’ control which necessarily limit the 
quantity of commitment decisions subjected to judicial review. It will be suggested that perhaps the 
only effective solution to combat the serious consequences of the current use of commitment 
decisions, thereby better realizing the values of the formal rule of law ideal, is to force the Courts into 
                                                     
19 E-Books (AT.39847) and Container Shipping (AT.39850) respectively. See Jenny, “Worst Decision of the EU Court of 
Justice: The Alrosa Judgment in Context and the Future of Commitment Decisions”, 38 Fordham International Law Journal 
(2015), 701-770, 724-725, 736-737. For a rare example of the Commission refusing to accept commitments owing to the 
severity of the alleged abuse: Telekomunikacja Polska (COMP/39.525). 
20 E.g. Wagner-Von Papp, “Best and Even Better Practices in Commitment Procedures after Alrosa: The Dangers of 
Abandoning the “Struggle for Competition Law””, 49 CML Rev. (2012), 929-970; Dunne, “Commitment Decisions in EU 
Competition Law”, 10(2) Journal of Competition Law & Economics (2014), 399-444. 
21 Art. 2 TEU. 
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a supervisory role for commitment decisions. This would however represent a fundamental shift in 
administrative-judicial relations in the field of EU competition law. 
              
2. Appeal I: The Effectiveness of Competition Enforcement without Competition Law 
A competition decision can be broken down into three ingredients. First, the law, the normative 
obligations determining the legality of conduct by firms, as authoritatively deduced by the ECJ from 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.22 Second, the facts, the matrix of events established by the Commission 
to have occurred. Third, bridging the gap between the first and second, the legal characterization of 
the factual circumstances as satisfying the norms determining legality or illegality. 
The effectiveness with which commitment decisions permit the Commission to successfully 
pursue its policy objectives concerns all three elements. Article 9 affords the discretion to investigate 
business conduct in a manner untouched by the pre-existing law developed by the ECJ. It can enforce 
competition policy beyond the law through advancing novel theories of harm (2.1) and below the law, 
without meeting deliberately high legal hurdles for condemning certain forms of conduct (2.2). 
Commitment decisions permit market interventions on an ad hoc basis against specific companies as 
and when the Commission sees fit, regardless of the legal originality or strength of its concerns. This 
is undoubtedly an effective means to achieve its policy aims, freed from the administrative rigidity 
and restraint of applying pre-existing legal norms to the ordinary evidential standard. To this end, the 
Commission’s discretion has achieved a great deal of good. Nevertheless, adopting the form of 
competition enforcement without competition law is not without its costs. 
2.1. Enforcement Beyond the Law 
Through commitment decisions the Commission has the discretion to target any business conduct, 
regardless of whether it has been previously been deemed illegal by the EU Courts.23 It can thereby 
effectively secure changes to subject-specific behaviour as thought necessary. Numerous examples 
could be offered of enforcement activity beyond the scope of pre-existing competition law.  
One such instance is patent ambush. In Rambus the Commission suggested that dishonesty in 
standard-setting procedures could be an abuse of dominance contrary to Article 102 TFEU. Patent 
holder Rambus was alleged to have “engaged in intentional deceptive conduct” by keeping secret the 
inclusion of its IP in the international standard for DRAM chips, aiming to subsequently charge 
considerable royalties for producers locked into the standard.24 The Commission’s goal of ensuring 
confidence in international standard-setting processes is commendable.25 That being accepted, the 
conduct scrutinized in Rambus bears no relation to pre-existing EU competition law.26 
Although there has yet to be an authoritative ruling on their legality, the Commission has also 
been able to secure remedies in response to the contractual use of most favoured nation (MFN) 
clauses through Article 9 decisions. In E-Books it raised concerns about five publishers separately 
negotiating agency contracts with Apple that all included various MFNs.27 The specific breach of 
Article 101 TFEU alleged was that they had jointly converted the sale of e-books from a wholesale to 
an agency model through introducing similar MFN clauses. The Commission suspected that the 
intention was to raise retail prices above those hitherto offered by Amazon, which had used the 
wholesale model to offer substantial discounts on e-books, thereby under-cutting direct sales of 
physical books by the publishers. The facts of E-Books were shuffled around in the recent Amazon 
                                                     
22 Art. 19 TEU. 
23 Cengiz, “Judicial Review and the Rule of Law in the EU Competition Law Regime after Alrosa”, 7(1) European 
Competition Journal (2011), 127-153, 137; Hjelmeng, “Competition Law Remedies: Striving for Coherence or Finding New 
Ways?”, 50(4) CML Rev. (2013), 1007-1037, 1012; Svetiev, “Settling or Learning: Commitment Decisions as a 
Competition Enforcement Paradigm”, 33(1) YEL (2014), 466-500, 470. 
24 Rambus (COMP/38.636), recital 27. 
25 Moullet, “How Should Undertakings Approach Commitment Proposal in Antitrust Proceedings?”, 34(2) ECLR (2013), 
86-100, 87. 
26 Lianos, “The Principle of Effectiveness, Competition Law Remedies and the Limits of Adjudication”, 3/2014 CLES 
Research Paper Series (2014), 24; Dunne, Competition Law and Economic Regulation: Making and Managing Markets, 
(CUP, 2015), pp. 110.  
27 E-Books.  
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commitments, where its own imposition of MFNs on publishers were thought to potentially breach 
Article 102 TFEU.28 The sincere motivation of the Commission in both was to tackle the artificial 
raising of consumer prices, a bread-and-butter concern of competition enforcement. Amazon is also 
one of the most robustly articulated commitment decisions to date, covering the potential 
anticompetitive consequences of MFNs in great detail. The Commission’s effective realization of its 
goal in these decisions was in no way prejudiced by the lack of clear, analogous legal precedents. 
Despite ultimately ending in failure, the Commission’s initial recourse to Article 9 for 
investigating preferential treatment of related services in Google Search (Shopping) further 
demonstrates the potential effectiveness of its discretion to counter commercial behaviour beyond pre-
existing legal prohibition. The theory of harm proposed from the beginning – displaying Google’s 
related shopping search results in response to generic search requests more favourably than competing 
shopping services – was always clearly driven by a desire to forestall potential market foreclosure in 
the very specific context of Google’s search engine domination.29 So too were the increasingly 
demanding remedial packages thrashed-out over multiple years to address this “preferential” or 
“favourable treatment”.30 But at no point did the Commission indicate how the investigated practice 
related to the legal norms deduced by the ECJ from Article 102 TFEU.31 The implication seems to 
have been that the positive ends of more competitive online search markets would legitimate any 
novel theory of harm. Indeed, the feast of economic analysis and famine of legal precedent that 
eventually emerged as the formal prohibition decision may be similarly motivated.32 Still, that this 
outcome was almost achieved through a commitment decision – novel theory of harm, ambitious 
remedies and all – is a testament to the policy effectiveness of this procedure, allowing the 
Commission to pursue its ends unencumbered by the scope of pre-existing competition law. 
As a final example of the efficacy of enforcement through commitment decisions in this 
manner, the Commission has frequently targeted capacity hoarding and strategic underinvestment in 
the energy sector.33 These investigations concern owners of infrastructure bottlenecks such as 
transmission networks, pipes, or terminals for importation. Capacity hoarding is where a vertically-
integrated bottleneck operator reserves for its upstream or downstream business a substantial portion 
of the infrastructure’s transmission volume for a long period.34 The Commission’s commitment 
decisions have found this to result from explicit contractual terms, vagueness as to spare capacity, 
poor congestion management, or simply failing to ease third party access.35 Sometimes these practices 
have blended into what it has called strategic underinvestment, where the bottleneck owner neglects to 
increase capacity that would facilitate upstream or downstream market entry. For example, Gaz de 
France concerned two import capacity terminals: for one, it criticized a failure to take seriously 
external offers to co-finance expansion; for the other, it censured the lack of investment in additional 
capacity that the Commission deemed “sufficiently profitable”.36 Commitment decisions have been a 
very effective method for addressing its view that vertically-integrated infrastructure owners 
necessarily have distorted incentives against capacity expansion to protect their upstream or 
downstream profits. It has essentially been able to secure “investment obligations” in capacity to 
foster increased market entry.37 Given the unpredictable impact upon business incentives to invest and 
                                                     
28 Amazon.  
29 IP/10/1624, “Commission probes allegations of antitrust violations by Google”. 
30 SPEECH/12/372, “Statement of VP Almunia on the Google antitrust investigation”. 
31 See Nazzini, “Google and the (Ever-Stretching) Boundaries of Article 102 TFUE”, 6(5) JECLAP (2015), 301-314, 307-
308; Akman, “The Theory of Abuse in Google Search: A Positive and Normative Assessment under EU Competition Law”, 
(2017) Journal of Law, Technology & Policy, 301-374. 
32 Google Search (Shopping) (AT.39740). 
33 Terminology adopted in SWD(2014)230/02, “Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003: 
Achievements and Future Perspectives”, 32. 
34 E.g. RWE Gas Foreclosure (COMP/39.402); Gaz de France (COMP/39.316); ENI (COMP/39.315); E.ON Gas 
(COMP/39.317); CEZ, a.s. (AT.39727). cf Scholz and Purps, “The Application of EC Competition Law in the Energy 
Sector”, 2(1) JECLAP (2011), 62-77, 73-74 (long-term entry booking is normal and promotes security of supply).   
35 E.g. RWE, recitals 26-27. 
36 Gaz de France, recital 39. Similarly in ENI the Commission criticized the firm for knowing that many requests went 
unmet but still failing to consider expansion or canvass opinions on co-financing it. 
37 Scholz and Purps, “The Application of EC Competition Law in the Energy Sector”, 1(1) JECLAP (2010), 37-51, 48. 
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innovate, it is possible to disagree with the desirability of this end.38 What cannot be doubted is that 
commitment decisions are an efficacious means for the Commission to realize its goals in the energy 
sector, despite “capacity hoarding” or “strategic underinvestment” bearing little relation to 
authoritative legal obligations deduced by the ECJ from the Treaties.39 
In short, commitment decisions have proven to be a powerful enforcement tool for wherever 
the Commission has reason to be believe that harm is being caused to markets, but where there has 
been no previous finding of illegality for the alleged theory of harm. Freed from the scope of the pre-
existing law of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, its discretionary interventions can be directed towards 
realizing its policy goals for particular markets and against specific firms as it deems necessary.       
2.2. Enforcement Below the Law 
The effectiveness of commitment decisions as a tool for competition enforcement does not end at 
permitting interventions beyond the scope of the law. Article 9 only requires the identification of a 
“possible” infringement of EU competition law, rather than a demonstration of an “actual” violation.40 
The Commission therefore has discretion as to the legal characterization of instant facts as meeting 
criteria for condemnation. As a result, it can intervene against conduct possibly below authoritative 
thresholds deduced by the EU Courts for a formal finding of illegality. Although (unsurprisingly) 
adamant that it does not use this discretion to close weak cases,41 its reasoning is often much more 
terse than in a fully-substantiated prohibition decision.42 Of course, commitment decisions are 
intended to offer a mechanism for cooperative case closure without the same level of evidential 
exactitude. Still, succinct explanations differ from questions as to whether the Commission is actually 
exercising its discretion to pursue conduct falling far short of deliberately narrow judicial 
requirements for finding illegality.43 As with commitment decisions reaching beyond the law, these 
examples of enforcement below the law reinforce the effectiveness of this discretion for the 
Commission to realize its various policy goals, often securing admirable results. 
A first illustration concerns the establishment of a position of collective dominance for the 
purposes of Article 102 TFEU. In a period of considerable embarrassment for the Commission,44 the 
General Court in Airtours stressed that the legal pre-requisites for finding concerted abuses of 
dominance were strict,45 ruling in the instant decision that the characterization of the UK market for 
short-haul package holidays as such did not meet the strict legal standard.46 The high hurdles for 
successfully substantiating collective dominance essentially restrained the Commission’s ability to 
effectively intervene in oligopolistic markets. But as demonstrated by German Electricity, 
commitment decisions offer the Commission the enforcement discretion to avoid meeting such legal 
hurdles.47 E.ON was alleged to have engaged in the serious practice of output limitation, but its 
dominance was dubious owing to a relatively low market share. Instead, the Commission suggested 
that E.ON may have engaged in an individual abuse of a collective dominant position. In the safe 
                                                     
38 See Scholz and Purps, ibid. (on cementing dominant bottlenecks by disincentivizing rivals from finding competing 
distribution methods); Merlino and Faella, “Strategic Underinvestment as an Abuse of Dominance under EU Competition 
Rules”, 36(4) World Comp. (2013), 513-539, 536 (on inhibiting infrastructure creation). 
39 Scholz and Purps, ibid.; Talus, “Just What is the Scope of the Essential Facilities Doctrine in the Energy Sector?: Third 
Party Access-Friendly Interpretation in the EU v. Contractual Freedom in the US”, 48(5) CML Rev. (2011), 1571-1597; 
Hjelming, supra note 23, 1012; Merlino and Faella, ibid., 516-519; Dunne, “Commitment Decisions in EU Competition 
Law”, 10(2) Journal of Competition Law & Economics (2014), 399-444, 421; Lianos, supra note 26, 24; Geradin and 
Mattioli, supra note 6, 640-642. 
40 “To Commit or not to Commit?: Deciding Between Prohibition and Commitments”, (2014) Competition Policy Brief .  
41 ibid.; MEMO/13/139, “Commitment decisions – frequently asked questions”. 
42 Geradin and Mattioli, supra note 6, 635. 
43 As alleged by Sadowska, “Energy Liberalization in an Antitrust Straitjacket: A Plant Too Far?”, 34(4) World Comp. 
(2011), 449-476, 451 (“far more perfunctory”, “weak” allegations); Cengiz, supra note 23, 137; Mariniello, supra note 17, 7; 
Jenny, supra note 19, 734; Witt, The More Economic Approach to EU Antitrust Law, (Hart, 2016), pp. 149-150 
(“conceptually hazy”). 
44 See Witt, ibid., pp. 27-32. 
45 T-342/99, Airtours v. Commission, EU:T:2002:146, para. 62. 
46 Ibid., para. 294 (lacking “cogent evidence”, “vitiated by a series of errors of assessment”). 
47 German Electricity Wholesale Market (COMP/39.388) and German Electricity Balancing Market (COMP/39.389) 
(hereafter “German Electricity”). 
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context of a commitment decision, the Commission was able to justify its characterization of there 
being collective dominance in a few hundred words without reference to the stringent legal elements 
of Airtours. Undoubtedly this was an effective means for it to remedy anticompetitive behaviour in 
this particular instance to the benefit of German energy customers. Nevertheless, whether Article 9 
was used to avoid the rigorous demonstration of collective dominance through a fully-substantiated 
prohibition decision is not without question. 
Establishing excessive pricing as an abuse contrary to Article 102 TFEU is also legally 
difficult, though has still been found by the Commission in a number of commitment decisions. The 
formative United Brands case established the test for excessive pricing to be bearing “no reasonable 
relation to the economic value of the product supplied”, either in comparison to competitive 
benchmarks or in itself.48 The haziness of this test has hampered condemnation of high prices by the 
Commission through fully-substantiated prohibition decisions for decades.49 Yet the discretionary 
evaluative latitude of commitment decisions avoids such evidential issues. For example in Standard 
and Poor’s, the Commission was confident in tersely concluding that prices “significantly exceed the 
costs incurred” so as to amount to an abuse of dominance, despite the usual contestability of such 
claims.50 Following the recent reengagement of the ECJ with this issue,51 the Gazprom commitment 
decision is slightly more rigorous, adopting competitive benchmarks for gas in Germany and the 
Netherlands to gauge the excessiveness of prices in Central and Eastern Europe, finding average 
differences of 22-44% (though reduced to 9-24% on another metric).52 Still, the evaluation that these 
variations meet the United Brands test is reached in little over a page. Exorbitantly high prices are an 
exercise of market power of clear consumer detriment, and the Commission’s determination to 
prevent exploitation is an understandable end of competition policy.53 Despite the difficulty of 
persuasively characterizing prices as excessive, commitments offer the decision-making discretion to 
reach such a conclusion with greater ease than at any time before Regulation 1/2003. 
A third example of the appealing enforcement effectiveness of the Commission’s latitude as 
to the legal evaluation of facts in commitment decisions concerns the law on refusals to grant access 
to physical property. In Bronner, the ECJ was confronted with whether refusing access for a small 
periodical to a national distribution system should be found abusive, contrary to Article 102 TFEU.54 
Following Advocate General Jacobs’ cautious warning that overeager conclusions of illegality in such 
circumstances could severely undermine investment incentives,55 the ECJ make it abundantly clear 
that such a finding should only be reached in the most limited circumstances: where the requesting 
party would be eliminated; access was “indispensable” to continue operating; that there were no 
actual or potential substitutes.56 That alternatives were “less advantageous” would not suffice.57 Such 
strictness in condemning refusals to grant access to physical infrastructure has been praised by 
commentators.58 While explicit and constructive refusals have occasionally been the subject of Article 
7 prohibition decisions, their characterization as meeting the demanding Bronner legal threshold59 
                                                     
48 C-27/76, United Brands and United Brands Continental v. Commission, EU:C:1978:22, para. 250. 
49 Dunne, supra note 39, 422. 
50 Standard and Poor’s (COMP/39.592), recital 37. See Dunne, ibid., 424 (“patently neglects” to meet the legal test). 
51 C-177/16, Autortiesību un Komunicēšanās Konsultāciju Aģentūra/Latvijas Autoru Apvienība v. Konkurences Padome, 
EU:C:2017:689. 
52 Gazprom, recitals 69-74. 
53 Enforcement against excessive pricing has returned to prominence under Commissioner Vestager: “Protecting Consumers 
from Exploitation”, speech available at <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-
2019/vestager/announcements/protecting-consumers-exploitation_en> (last visited 30 October 2019); IP/17/1323 
“Commission opens formal investigation into Aspen Pharma's pricing practices for cancer medicines” (AT.40394).   
54 C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v Mediaprint, EU:C:1998:569. 
55 Opinion of A.G. Jacobs, EU:C:1998:264, paras. 56-58.  
56 C-7/97, Bronner, para. 41. 
57 Ibid., para. 43. 
58 E.g. Capobianco, “The Essential Facility Doctrine: Similarities and Differences between the American and the European 
Approach”, 26(6) EL Rev. (2001), 548-564, 558-560; Mavroidis and Neven, “Bronner Kebab: Beyond Refusal to Deal and 
Duty to Cooperate” in Ehlermann and Atanasiu (Eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2003: What is an Abuse of a 
Dominant Position?, (Hart, 2006), pp. 362. 
59 As reformulated in “Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Art. 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive 
exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings”, O.J. 2009, C 45/7, recitals 81-90. 
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invariably requires long and detailed appraisal by the Commission.60 This has not been the case for 
the use of this concept when conducting enforcement activity through commitment decisions. The 
Commission has been up-front that it regularly finds constructive refusals to grant access to energy 
infrastructure.61 This is despite academic scepticism as to whether the terminals, networks, and pipes 
under scrutiny actually are indispensable and necessary to operate.62 Notwithstanding such doubts, the 
Commission’s characterization of the refusal as potentially amounting to an abuse is relatively scant 
in commitment decisions, bordering on assertion.63 The four recitals in E.ON Gas and ENI,64 two 
recitals in Gaz de France,65 and single recital in RWE66 on whether the facilities questioned were 
actually essential, suggest that through commitment decisions the Commission has the discretion to 
reach conduct potentially below the exacting requirements stipulated by the ECJ in Bronner. The 
opportunity to dispense with rigorous legal appraisal of the instant facts has, however, permitted it to 
effectively pursue its policy goals in energy markets. 
 
*** 
 
Commitment decisions have proven to be a powerful tool of competition enforcement for the 
Commission to realize its ends with utmost efficacy. In permitting market interventions beyond the 
scope of pre-existing law or, where difficult evaluative thresholds exist, below judicially-determined 
legal strictures, it has the discretion to target any market conduct it deems problematic. This is 
competition enforcement without competition law, and it is undoubtedly very effective for realizing 
the Commission’s often commendable goals.             
3. Appeal II: The Effectiveness of Unrestrained Remedies 
The decision-making discretion to persuade companies to merely cease any market conduct where the 
Commission has competitive concerns, even if beyond or below pre-existing legal prohibition, would 
in itself be a valuable enforcement tool. But the effectiveness with which the Commission can reach 
its ends through commitment decisions goes far beyond such remedial restraint. Instead, it also enjoys 
the discretion to accept all manner of outcomes to close the investigation.67 Commitment decisions 
have been a site of extensive experimentation in competition remedies, prompting claims that the 
appeal of far-reaching outcomes are responsible for their prevalence.68 The attraction to competition 
decision-makers is unsurprising. Through commitment decisions the Commission essentially has the 
discretion to entirely redraw targeted markets according to its idealized vision, whether informed by 
efficiency, market entry, European integration, or anything else. 
Although free to impose behavioural and structural solutions in prohibition decisions, the text 
of Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003 only permits remedies that are “proportionate to the infringement 
committed” and necessary to bring it “effectively to an end”.69 Fines are the “baseline” remedy 
beyond cease-and-desist orders,70 even where recidivism is a key concern.71 The Commission has 
                                                     
60 E.g. Telekomunikacja Polska (COMP/39.525), recitals 695-884; Slovak Telekom (AT.39523), recitals 355-821; ARA 
Foreclosure (AT.39759), recitals 74-115 (more truncated as an unusual hybrid voluntary settlement).  
61 Working Document cited supra note 33, 31-32. E.g. RWE, Gaz de France, E.ON Gas, ENI.  
62 For discussion: Scholz and Purps, supra note 34, 74-75; Talus, supra note 39, 1588-1590; Merlino and Faella, supra note 
39, 531. 
63 As claimed by: Ibáñez Colomo, “On the Application of Competition Law as Regulation: Elements for a Theory”, 29(1) 
YEL (2010), 261-306, 298; Merlino and Faella, ibid.; Dunne, supra note 39, 424.  
64 E.ON Gas, recitals 32-35; ENI, recitals 39-42. 
65 Gaz de France, recitals 26-27. 
66 RWE, recital 22. 
67 On remedial discretion, see Lianos, “Competition Law Remedies: In Search of a Theory”, 3/2011 CLES Working Paper 
Series (2011). 
68 E.g. Gerard, “Negotiated Remedies in the Modernization Era: The Limits of Effectiveness”, available at 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2395414> (last visited 30 October 2019), 5 (commitment decisions 
are “entirely driven by the nature and scope of remedies”). 
69 See also Regulation 1/2003, recital 12, on structural remedies only being available where there is no equally effective 
behavioural change or where they would be less of a burden.  
70 Working Document cited supra note 33, 56. 
71 For an overview of competition remedies: Ritter, “How Far Can the Commission Go When Imposing Remedies for 
Antitrust Infringements?”, 7(9) JECLAP (2016), 587-598.  
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never imposed a structural remedy through a prohibition decision.72 Such remedial restraint has 
produced rare judicial engagement with this subject.73 The main exception is the General Court’s 
annulment of the imposition of a monitoring trustee in Microsoft owing to illegal delegation of 
enforcement powers and disproportionality.74 The Court was clear in stressing that the Commission 
“does not have unlimited discretion when formulating remedies” in prohibition decisions.75 
In contrast, the text of Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 states that the Commission can accept 
any remedies that “meet the concerns” it has expressed, a lower threshold for justifying more radical 
outcomes. Many have suggested that commitment decisions have thus been used to secure remedies 
that would be overturned by the EU Courts if part of a prohibition decision.76 
Early extensions beyond the strictures of Article 7 prohibition decisions were relatively 
modest. Although the Coca-Cola commitment decision only expressed concerns about contractual 
practices with distributors in four countries, the final remedial package covered all EU member states 
where it was dominant.77 Similarly, when comparing the Premier League commitment decision on 
joint-selling of football broadcasting rights with the almost identical exemption decision in 
Champions League, the former included a bonus remedial obligation to prevent a single buyer from 
acquiring all of the packages.78 
It has since become clear that commitment decisions are a very effective tool for the 
Commission to pursue its policy goals through designing creative remedies. For instance, Microsoft 
(Tying) evidences an apparent desire to assist smaller competitors of the technology giant through 
pro-active obligations.79 As with the (in)famous investigation into Windows Media Player,80 the 
follow-up commitment decision was directed at the pre-installation of Internet Explorer on the 
Windows operating system as a possible abuse of dominance.81 Rather than simply requiring the two 
products to be decoupled, the Commission secured a pledge from Microsoft to offer a consumer ballot 
screen offering a range of browsers from which to choose, thereby giving its rivals unprecedented 
visibility.82 Similarly extensive remedies to assist small technology firms were also sought in the 
abandoned Google Search (Shopping) commitment negotiations. Over four years the Commission and 
Google’s rivals attempted to reconceptualize how the search engine displayed its related shopping 
service and those of others, scrutinizing package after package to get the “icing on the cake” and 
finally the “cherry on top”.83 Commissioner Almunia considered the final set to be “far-reaching” 
concessions to “restore a level playing-field” in online search.84 Although failing to convince his 
successor, the extent of the radical remedies to which Google was willing to commit nevertheless 
demonstrates the effectiveness with which the Commission can pursue its enforcement goals. 
Without doubt, the most vivid examples of the Commission’s remedial discretion are 
commitment decisions in the energy sector. This is an area of activity where it has a very particular 
vision which it wishes to replicate as closely as possible. Since the 1990s, it has spearheaded various 
EU legislative packages endeavouring to liberalize domestic markets, foster entry to challenge 
                                                     
72 It tried in Continental Can Company (IV.26811) through the decision was overturned by the ECJ on the unrelated issue of 
market definition: C-6/72, Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company Inc. v. Commission, EU:C:1973:2. 
In ARA Foreclosure, the investigated undertaking voluntarily offered divestiture.  
73 See Ritter, supra note 71. 
74 T-201/04, Microsoft v. Commission, EU:T:2007:289, paras. 1251-1279. 
75 Ibid., para. 1276. 
76 Especially in the energy sector: Rab and Sukhtankar, “Alternative Competition Law Enforcement in Energy: The 
Application of Commitments under Article 9 Regulation 1/2003 in the Energy Sector”, 17(6) Utilities Law Review (2008), 
199-201; Ibáñez Colomo, supra note 63, 300; Scholz and Purps, supra note 37, 51; Wagner-Von Papp, supra note 20, 960. 
77 Coca-Cola (COMP/A.39.116/B2). 
78 Joint selling of the Commercial Rights of the UEFA Champions League (COMP/C.2-37.398); Joint Selling of Media 
Rights to the FA Premier League (COMP/C-2/38.173). See Ibáñez Colomo, supra note 63, 289-290. 
79 On the risk of commitment decisions facilitating an inefficient bias against concentration: Ibáñez Colomo, ibid., 281-282; 
Hjelming, supra note 23, 1018-1019. 
80 Microsoft (COMP/C-3/37.792); T-201/04, Microsoft.  
81 Microsoft (Tying) (COMP/C-3/39.530). 
82 For commentary: Ibáñez Colomo, supra note 63, 294; Rab, Monnoyeur, and Sukhtankar, “Commitments in EU 
Competition Cases: Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003, its application and the challenges ahead”, 1(3) JECLAP (2010), 171-
188; Aleixo, supra note 13, 474-475.  
83 Leyden and Dolmans, “The Google Commitments: Now with a Cherry on Top”, 5(5) JECLAP (2014), 253-255. 
84 SPEECH/14/93, “Statement on the Google investigation”. 
 10 
vertically-integrated former incumbents, and introduce a borderless European energy market.85 Its 
2007 report found a number of outstanding inadequacies,86 though its insistence that the appropriate 
solution was regulation rather than competition enforcement was short-lived.87 Commitment decisions 
have given the Commission ample discretion to effectively restructure energy markets through 
creative and radical remedies. As examples of the remedial latitude afforded by this investigatory 
procedure are too numerous to all be considered in detail, priority is given to the most dramatic. 
In Swedish Interconnectors the electricity transmission system operator had managed 
congested internal bottlenecks at peak times by restricting exports to Denmark, thereby 
discriminatorily raising prices for Danish customers.88 Plainly animated by the goal of market 
integration,89 the remedies concluded in the commitment decision fundamentally reorganized the 
Swedish electricity system.90 Despite the existence of less drastic solutions,91 and regulatory 
ambivalence as to the chosen option for congestion management,92 the Commission used its discretion 
to realize its ideal outcome. It similarly reconstructed the Bulgarian energy market in BEH 
Electricity.93 Commitments were effectively used to create a new power exchange for electricity, 
animated by noble intentions of facilitating anonymous sales, increasing liquidity, improving 
transparency, and promoting cross-border integration. 
The efficacy of the Commission’s remedial discretion through this procedural route can also 
be gleaned where the final commitments bear little relation to the conduct deemed problematic.94 In 
German Electricity Wholesale, allegations of production withdrawal raising prices for downstream 
retailers were closed with the divestiture of generation capacity to a third party, a remedy clearly 
intended to force new entry.95 Similarly in CEZ, the Commission was concerned with long-term 
capacity booking into the transmission network by the former electricity monopolist, potentially 
reducing entry and expansion by rivals.96 But despite this specific impetus, and contrary to remedies 
in earlier analogous investigations,97 CEZ also agreed to divest generation capacity. In the recent 
Gazprom decision too, allegations of partitioning national markets to charge excessive prices were 
actually met with an innovative scheme for rearranging the delivery of gas from Central Europe to the 
Baltic states (and vice versa), thereby overcoming the lack of physical interconnectors for cross-
border energy movement.98 In this way the Commission’s remedial discretion is very effective for 
achieving its goals, permitting decision-making outcomes that even have - at best – a tenuous 
connection to the potential competitive concerns. 
So potent are the remedies which may be secured through commitment decisions that the 
Commission is even able to secure those explicitly rejected as mandatory in regulation, essentially 
side-stepping obstructive intermediaries to its ends: Member States in the EU legislative process.99 In 
                                                     
85 For overviews: Cameron, “The Internal Market in Energy: Harnessing the New Regulatory Regime”, 30(5) EL Rev. 
(2005), 631-648; Rab and Sukhtankar, supra note 76. 
86 COM(2006)851final, “Inquiry pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 into the European gas and electricity 
sectors” (e.g. high concentration, vertical integration, barriers to entry, lack of price transparency). 
87 Ibid., 9. 
88 Swedish Interconnectors (COMP/39.351). Similar conduct was recently investigated in the DE/DK Interconnector 
(AT.40461) commitment decision, though involved restricting the importation of cheaper electricity into Germany. 
89 Sadowska and Willems, “Power Markets Shaped by Antitrust”, 9(1) European Competition Journal (2013), 131-173, 143-
144. 
90 Splitting Sweden into two bidding zones with their own electricity prices, deliberately leading to higher tariffs for some 
southern customers but hopefully signalling the need for investment. 
91 For discussion of counter-trading, the preferred option of the Swedish operator: Sadowska and Willems, supra note 89, 
153-154.  
92 Ibid., 161-162, 170 (accepting cross-border restrictions). 
93 BEH Electricity (AT.39767). 
94 See Lianos, supra note 67, 28. 
95 (COMP/39.388). For doubts above the suitability of this remedy: Scholz and Purps, supra note 37, 51. 
96 (AT.39727). 
97 Gaz de France (COMP/39.316) and E.ON Gas (COMP/39.317) also concerned long-term capacity booking into gas 
transmission networks. In contrast, the remedies agreed were for the sale of some contracted capacity and limits to the 
overall percentage reserved. 
98 (AT.39816) 
99 See: Hancher and de Hauteclocque, “Manufacturing the EU Energy Markets: The Current Dynamics of Regulatory 
Practice”, 11(3) Competition and Regulation in Network Industries (2010), 307-334, 329-330; Sadowska and Willems, supra 
note 89, 142; Dunne, supra note 39, 435; Geradin and Mattioli, supra note 6, 641-642. 
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German Electricity Balancing, RWE, and ENI, various bottleneck infrastructures (transmission 
networks, cross-border pipes) were divested by vertically-integrated energy companies who could 
have used their control to the disadvantage of upstream and downstream rivals.100 This outcome 
reflected the Commission’s belief that the only suitable remedy to remove the allegedly inherent risk 
of distorted management incentives was ownership unbundling:101 operation by an independent firm 
singularly driven by the commercial motivation to efficiently running the bottleneck, invest in 
expansion, and stimulate upstream/downstream entry.102 But making ownership unbundling 
compulsory was rejected by Member States in the Third Energy Package, instead leaving open a 
variety of options.103 Notwithstanding concerns for the legitimacy of the EU legislative process and 
the separation of powers,104 the attractive efficacy of commitment decisions are clear: in this instance 
their broad remedial discretion permitted the Commission to pursue its ends of restricting regulatory 
choices through one-to-one discussions with infrastructure owners.105 
Given the remedial latitude afforded by commitment decisions, their appeal for conducting 
and concluding competition investigations is surely irresistible to the Commission. Commentators are 
correct to equate this manner of enforcement with regulation;106 the Commission can, in theory, reach 
any outcome (divestiture, redrawing Member State markets, forced entry, aiding competitors, 
anything else) even where they appear unrelated to the initial competitive concern.107 When combined 
with the discretion to investigate market conduct beyond and beneath the law – useful even if simply 
resulting in cessation – the Commission arguably has the most powerful tool conceivable for pursuing 
its various policy ends with utmost effectiveness. These decision have in many instances done a great 
deal of good for European consumers. Nevertheless, the realization of such ends through absolute 
discretion is antithetical to the formal rule of law ideal and not without consequences.           
4. Theoretical Interlude: The Political and Economic Value of the Formal Rule of Law 
Despite recent Commission claims to the contrary,108 it has been recognized for centuries that the rule 
of law is an inherently contestable concept, which perhaps accounts for its longevity in Western legal 
philosophy.109 To avoid its use as a meaningless slogan,110 it is necessary to be very specific about the 
particular conceptualization of the ideal adopted from the extensive catalogue of formulations. 
                                                     
100 (COMP/39.388); (COMP/39.402); (COMP/39.315). 
101 As evidenced in the speeches of Commissioner Kroes in the lead up to the Third Energy Package, e.g. SPEECH/06/541 
“The Need for a renewed European Energy Policy”; SPEECH/07/175 “Improving Europe’s energy markets through more 
competition”; SPEECH/07/574 “Improving competition in European energy markets through effective unbundling”; 
SPEECH/08/106 “Structural Reforms to the Energy Market”.  
102 For academic support: Pollitt, “The Arguments for and against Ownership Unbundling of Energy Transmission 
Networks”, 36 Energy Policy (2006), 704-713; Von Rosenberg, “Unbundling through the Back Door… the Case of Network 
Divestiture as a Remedy in the Energy Sector”, 30(5) ECLR (2009), 237-254, 241-242; Moselle and Black, “Vertical 
Separation as an Appropriate Remedy”, 2(1) JECLAP (2011), 84-90.  
103 Directive 2009/73/EC Concerning Common Rules for the Internal Market in Natural Gas, O.J. 2009, L 211/94; 
Directive 2009/72/EC Concerning Common Rules for the Internal Market in Electricity, O.J. 2009, L 211/55. For an 
overview: Johnston and Block, EU Energy Law, (OUP, 2012), pp. 37-39. 
104 See Forrester, “Creating New Rules or Closing Easy Cases? Policy Consequences for Public Enforcement of Settlements 
under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003”, in Ehlermann and Marquis (Eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2008: 
Antitrust Settlements under EC Competition Law, (Hart, 2010), pp. 65; Cengiz, supra note 23, 136. 
105 For comment: Piergiovanni, “Competition and Regulation in the Energy Sector in Europe in the Post-Sector Inquiry Era”, 
5(2) Competition Law International (2010); Johnston and Block, supra note 103, pp. 71-72; Dunne, supra note 39, 430. 
106 E.g. Forrester, supra note 104, pp. 659; Schweitzer, “Commitment Decisions under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003: The 
Developing EC Practice and Case Law,” in Ehlermann and Marquis, supra note 104, pp. 559; Moullet, supra note 25, 86; 
Sadowska and Willems, supra note 89, 142; Dunne, supra note 39, 430; Jenny, supra note 19, 702.  
107 It has sometimes been claimed that the discretion in commitment decisions to expand the theory of harm allows the 
Commission to gain broader remedies (e.g. Sadowska, supra note 43, 451-453; Gerard, supra note 68, 13-14; Lianos, supra 
note 26, 11-12). The analysis in this section challenges such suggestions: as any conduct and any remedy can result from a 
commitment decision, there is no need for the Commission to connect the two halves at all. 
108 COM(2019) 343 final, “Strengthening the Rule of Law Within the Union: A Blueprint for Action”, 1 (“well-defined in its 
core meaning.”). 
109 See generally: Hutchinson and Monahan, “Democracy and the Rule of Law’ in (Eds.) The Rule of Law: Ideal or Ideology, 
(Carswell, 1987), pp. 99; Waldron, “Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)?”, 21(2) Law and 
Philosophy (2002), 137-164, 140-141; Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory, (CUP, 2004); Loughlin, 
Foundations of Public Law, (OUP, 2010), pp. 312-313; European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice 
Commission), ‘Report on the Rule of Law’ CDL-AD(2011)003rev.   
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The critique of competition enforcement through commitment decisions offered in the next 
section adopts a formal understanding of the rule of law, based upon the similar accounts of Hayek, 
Fuller, and Raz, plus the critiques of Unger, Nonet and Selznick.111 It also closely aligns with the 
articulations offered by the Venice Commission advising the Council of Europe, and by a 
Commission report on strengthening the rule of law within the Union.112 As an ambition for the form 
of legal obligations and their enforcement, to accept the desirability of its realization is to demand 
more than the mere constitutional “legality” of normative acts. As understood here, it is to aspire to a 
legal system of normative obligations which approximate principles (i) and (ii), within an institutional 
framework providing (iii): 
(i) Normative comprehensibility: legal subjects are able to comprehend their obligations 
and rights. This is facilitated by the many more specific formal characteristics often 
posited: publicity, prospectivity, clarity, consistency, constancy, possibility, and so 
on. 
(ii) Generalized norms of equal application: in terms of their substantive scope, laws are 
generalized (abstracted, universalized) away from particular individuals and 
circumstances that may fall within their ambit. With regard to their enforcement,113 
all similar instances coming within their reach should be treated equally, consistent 
with past and future decision-making. The formal antithesis of this is ad hoc, subject-
specific determinations of legality. 
(iii) Independent review: individuals subjected to a normative determination have an 
independent mechanism for checking the legal validity of this power and, if decision-
making is premised on realizing certain societal goals (e.g. promoting “competition”), 
for reviewing substantive compliance of decisions with this condition of power-
conferral. This is usually entrusted to courts.  
Each aspect of this conceptualization of the formal rule of law has been acknowledged to be 
of considerable virtue throughout centuries of scholarship. In political liberalism,114 comprehensible 
norms are seen to respect the rationality of legal subjects and facilitate the freedom to plan their 
affairs.115 They also allow for the legitimate allocation of responsibility and punishment for knowing 
transgressions of norms that could have been understood in advance.116 Therefore where a decision 
(administrative or judicial) is necessary to resolve a contentious legal issue or extend normative 
prohibition, the affected parties who could not rationally change their behaviour to avoid illegality 
ought not to be punished. Aspiring to common action through generalized and equally-applied norms 
is further considered an additional limitation upon state action, reaching beyond more recognized 
devices of liberal constitutionalism.117 Such a restrictive form facilitates normative comprehensibility 
by marginalizing discretionary decision-making on an ad hoc basis,118 simultaneously guarding 
against the risk of discriminatory legal treatment.119 
                                                                                                                                                                     
110 Loughlin, ibid.. 
111 Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, (Routledge, 2001); Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, (Routledge 2013); Fuller, The 
Morality of Law, rev. ed. (Yale University Press, 1969), pp 33-39; Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality, 
Clarendon Press, 2011), pp. 214-218; Unger, Law in Modern Society: Toward a Criticism of Social Theory, (Free Press, 
1977), pp. 52-54, 176-177; Nonet and Selznick, Law & Society in Transition: Toward Responsive Law (Transaction 
Publishers, 2001), pp. 53-54.   
112 Venice Commission, supra note 109, 10; “Strengthening the Rule of Law”, supra note 108, 3. 
113 On the close relationship between generalized norms and equal enforcement: Radin, “Reconsidering the Rule of Law”, 
69(4) Boston University Law Review (1989), 781-819, 785. 
114 Marxists criticize this account, seeing de jure normative generality and formal equality as smokescreens for de facto 
inequality in everyday life. See Collins, Marxism and Law, (OUP, 1982).   
115 E.g. Locke, Second Treatise of Government and a Letter Concerning Toleration, (OUP, 2016), pp. 13, 70; Montesquieu, 
“The Spirit of the Laws” in The Complete Works of M de Montesquieu Volume I (T Evans, 1777), pp. 198; Hayek, Serfdom, 
supra note 111, pp. 75-76; Hayek, Law, supra note 111, pp. 102-103; Raz, supra note 111, pp. 214; Rawls, A Theory of 
Justice: Revised Edition, (Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 208-210. 
116 Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, (Routledge 2006), pp. 181; Rawls, ibid., pp. 212; Epstein, Skepticism and Freedom: 
A Modern Case for Classical Liberalism, (University of Chicago Press, 2003), pp. 140 
117 E.g. limited competence conferral, protection for constitutional rights, the separation of powers.  
118 See Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals” in Gregor (ed.) Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy, (CUP, 1996), pp. 450-
456; Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 8th ed. (Liberty Fund, 1982), pp. 110; Hayek, Serfdom, 
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Both aspirational principles (i) and (ii) of the formal rule of law also find justifications in 
various branches of economics, a complementary line of reasoning which is especially important in 
the field of competition policy. New institutional economics conceptualizes laws as informational 
regularities relied upon by actors with bounded rationality, to thereby more efficiently coordinate their 
spontaneous ordering through the price mechanism.120 The effectiveness of laws as institutions which 
simplify decision-making is undermined if their content is not comprehensible to its users.121 
Normative stability is further weakened by legal determinations through ad hoc, discretionary 
interventions, recommending instead a generalized scope for laws.122 Given the importance of the 
legal system for the functioning of markets, public choice theory highlights that private actors may 
lobby legislators and decision-makers to act to their individual benefit (e.g. closing market entry, 
restricting imports, protective regulation).123 The related field of constitutional economics suggests as 
a solution the obligation to formulate and apply generalized laws, as opposed to the broad 
administrative discretion to offer subject-specific privileges.124 
It is important to stress the aspirational nature of the formal rule of law; complete 
comprehensibility and absolute generality of norms are incapable of perfect realization.125 Rather than 
binary compliance with the ideal, to approximate the formal rule of law is to progress along a sliding 
scale of legal forms, from “less” to “more” comprehensible and generalized norms. This is why 
principle (iii), independent review by courts, is a necessary institutional complement.126 Of course, the 
rule of law means little if there is no mechanism for ensuring congruence between norms and lived 
experience, especially when leading to punishment.127 But more important in terms of its delivery, the 
opportunity for review allows courts to prospectively formulate clearer, more generalized legal norms 
in response to individual administrative determinations that may,128 for instance, apply vague 
standards, exercise unstructured discretion, or make context-specific determinations of legality.129 
Through this institutional fall-back, the political and economic virtues of the formal rule of law are 
more likely to be realized over time. 
The conceptualization adopted here is not substantive;130 a “rule-book” rather than a “rights”-
based approach.131 Realizing the formal rule of law does not mean that laws are just, democratic,132 or, 
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244-245. Similarly Hayek, Law, ibid., pp. 359, 439, 463.  
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more pertinently in this context, economically-informed. But rather than a failing, the deliberate 
minimalism of this conceptualization of the rule of law isolates the desirable consequences of the 
purely formal characteristics themselves, without their being lost in broader visions of political theory 
and constitutional design.133  
As briefly recounted, the formal rule of law is an aspiration of considerable political and 
economic value. This substantial justificatory background is often absent from less theoretical 
analyses of “the rule of law” and commitment decisions, or competition literature more generally.134 
The perennial problem is that such political and economic goods are achieved through requiring laws 
to take a form that is restrained, rigid, and subject to independent review. Understandably, these are 
not characteristics which instantly appeal to administrative authorities whose commitment is to pursue 
societal good/s with utmost efficacy. Approximating the formal rule of law marginalizes 
determinations of legality through ad hoc, subject-specific, unstructured discretion, which decision-
makers may consider the most effective means to realize their ends. A trade-off therefore exists 
between the effective pursuit of societal goals – ends - and approximation of the formal rule of law – 
means. The Commission’s contemporary use of commitment decisions for enforcing EU competition 
law illustrates the strongest possible emphasis upon the former and severest consequent degradation 
of the latter. This is not coherent with the vision of a Union founded upon the rule of law.135  
5. Problematic Means: Implications of the Form of Commitment Decisions 
Sections 2 and 3 argued that commitment decisions offer an undeniably appealing procedure for the 
Commission to enforce competition law. The discretion they provide allows it to censure any business 
conduct, whether beyond or below pre-existing legal obligations, and conclude with any remedial 
package. But using commitment decisions so readily represents the maximal prioritization of pursuing 
the Commission’s ends with utmost effectiveness through administrative discretion. As a consequence 
of the ends/means trade-off discussed above, it also evidences a lack of concern for the formulation 
and equal application of generalized competition law norms that are comprehensible to businesses. In 
essence, it is a case study in the implications of failing to realize the formal rule of law. 
The Commission’s unbounded discretion to secure changes against any business conduct 
systematically undermines the normative comprehensibility of EU competition enforcement for all 
firms. By successfully mounting investigations beyond the pre-existing scope of the law with novel 
theories of harm or below judicially-determined thresholds for characterizing certain types of conduct 
as illegal, businesses have no reasonably guaranteed zone of legality. In both instances, the 
authoritative legal norms deduced by the EU Courts from Articles 101 and 102 TFEU fail to 
prospectively demarcate the boundary between permission and prohibition as they have no restraining 
influence upon the Commission’s Article 9 discretion. This is not simply a case of concentric 
normative circles, with the scope of conduct caught by commitment decisions being somewhat 
broader at the edge than the Courts’ jurisprudence. All business behaviour beyond or below the pre-
existing ambit of EU competition law can potentially be questioned and lead to remedial change. With 
unlimited decision-making discretion, official recommendations that companies will be fine if they 
simply “stay on the right side of the law at all times” ring hollow.136 Firms can act within the confines 
of authoritative competition law and still be the subject of this type of enforcement. The 
Commission’s calculation of the benefits of adopting individual commitment decisions – pursuit of its 
ends with utmost effectiveness as it deems necessary – fails to take into account the costs of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
131 Following the terminology of Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, (OUP, 1985), pp. 11-13. This prima facie contrasts with 
references to human rights protection in the Venice Commission and EU Commission reports (supra note 112). Yet on 
closer inspection, the discussion of rights in the former is only concerned with fair and effective judicial procedure (at 12-
13), while the latter does not include rights themselves as part of the “key principles” of the rule of law (at 3). 
132 As emphasized in Habermas, supra note 118. 
133 Raz, supra note 111, pp. 211. 
134 E.g. the important works included supra note 20. 
135 Art. 2 TEU; C-294/83, Parti écologiste "Les Verts" v. European Parliament, EU:C:1986:166, para. 23. 
136 SPEECH/13/210, “Remedies, commitments and settlements in antitrust” (Commissioner Almunia). 
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interventions that undermine systemic aspirations towards normative comprehensibility for all 
firms.137 
Perhaps this picture of normative anarchy from the perspective of the formal rule of law is too 
stark. Although with a largely negative intent, some have speculated that commitment decisions might 
themselves come to offer guidance to businesses, crystallizing into a “shadow jurisprudence”.138 
Cognition of permissible and prohibited might still be possible, but firms would just have to look to 
how the Commission has exercised its discretion in commitment decisions, rather than the case law. 
The Staff Working Paper 2009 suggested that this was the Commission’s own reading of its early 
record.139 
Putting to one side inconsistent Commission admissions that only prohibition decisions 
offered legal certainty to other firms,140 there are two reasons for scepticism that commitment 
decisions could ossify into a series of reasonably comprehensible norms. These caveats further 
emphasize the implications of prioritizing the form of discretionary decision-making over 
approximating the rule of law ideal. 
The first cause for caution relates to the nature of the EU legal order as laid out in the 
Treaties. No matter how many commitment decisions are concluded or how consistently like 
investigations are treated alike, the unavoidable truth of the EU’s legal architecture is that they can 
never be taken as authoritative determinations of competition law. Although the Commission has 
competence to investigate suspected violations of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU,141 it is the sole 
preserve of the ECJ to authoritatively interpret those provisions and deduce the obligations incumbent 
upon businesses. Despite their frequency and remedial outcomes, without the ECJ’s seal of approval 
normative indications from commitment decisions are necessarily more precarious points of reference 
against which to orientate business decision-making. The Commission’s discretion to intervene 
against potentially anticompetitive behaviour may conclude the individual investigation, but cannot 
reliably inform other firms as to the legality of the practice for all. 
When it comes to enforcement beyond judicially-determined laws, inconsistency between the 
silence of the case law and discretionary decision-making on unprecedented practices means that the 
latter exist within a normative void, their legality never authoritatively settled. At the same time, the 
jurisprudence of the Courts, the only valid elucidations of competition obligations upon market actors, 
becomes stale, failing to evolve alongside constantly innovating business practices. If, for instance, 
patent ambush is a live concern with the rising importance of intellectual property in international 
standards,142 the authoritative norms of EU competition law contain a gap that matters to markets, yet 
cannot be decisively addressed through the commitments procedure alone.143 
With regard to investigating conduct below the law, the Commission’s discretion is directly 
undermining the normative assurance offered to businesses by high legal thresholds for intervention. 
Such substantial legal hurdles were deliberately formulated by the EU Courts to restrain the 
Commission’s ability to reach particular conclusion, thereby reflecting the controversy of, e.g., 
collective dominance, administrative price regulation, or threatening investment incentives through 
over-eagerly characterizing refusals to grant access to physical infrastructure as abusive. Although not 
impossible legal options, businesses could previously take solace in their limitation to truly 
exceptional circumstances, restraining Commission decision-making. Nevertheless, the unbounded 
discretion afforded by commitment decisions has allowed it to sidestep such limitations, transforming 
once rare legal findings into now rather routine elements of enforcement, thereby undermining their 
reassuring clarity for businesses. 
                                                     
137 As similarly suggested by Schweitzer, supra note 106, pp. 57; Wagner-Von Papp, supra note 20, 964; Botteman and 
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141 Art. 105 TFEU.  
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In this way, authoritative, judicially-determined norms and unauthoritative commitment 
decisions reaching beyond and below such laws exist in parallel. Their inconsistent scope for 
permission and prohibition has degraded the normative comprehensibly afforded to firms by the 
former, without providing any additional clarity to the demarcation of legality through the latter. 
The second reason for scepticism that the frequent use of commitment decisions could 
eventually crystallize into a guiding body of norms goes to the connection between principles (i) and 
(ii) of the formal rule of law sketched above. The comprehensibility of legal obligations is affected by 
the extent to which they are formulated as generalized, equally-applicable norms.144 Of course, 
discretionary, subject-specific decisions addressed to a particular firm makes their individual 
obligations under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU clear. Yet normative comprehensibility is only 
improved for all legal subjects if the specific instance can be generalized to indicate a foreseeable 
pattern of future competition enforcement. With many commitment decisions, it is simply not possible 
to engage in this crucial step of extrapolation as they are so tied to their specific context, leading to a 
substantial degree of uncertainty for businesses. Furthermore, there are indications that the 
Commission doesn’t actually want to generalize its individual findings, preferring instead to maintain 
its unbounded discretion going forward. 
Considering the previous examples of enforcement beyond the law, it appears that the 
Commission often uses commitment decisions to create exceptional findings of possible illegality at 
the level of particular industries or even individual businesses. This raises questions of equal 
treatment before the law and makes it difficult for different sectors or firms to comprehend whether 
comparable obligations apply to them. What, for example, are other businesses to glean from the 
Commission’s distaste for: competitors all including MFN clauses in their agency agreements with the 
intent of forcing a wholesaler to switch model and thus stop undercutting prices for products not 
subject to the agreement;145 or of owners of infrastructure bottlenecks reserving substantial access and 
protecting their upstream/downstream business by failing to invest in capacity expansion or accepting 
offers/inviting responses from competitors to co-finance increases?146 Article 7 prohibition decisions 
are certainly not entirely free of such staccato enforcement.147 Nevertheless, over the decades the EU 
Courts have developed a broad body of generalized legal presumptions: absolute territorial protection 
is presumed to breach Article 101,148 while a dominant firm pricing below average variable cost will 
likely fall foul of Article 102 TFEU.149 Conversely, open exclusive licences150 or common terms in 
franchising agreements151 have been deemed to fall outside the scope of the Article 101(1) 
prohibition. Between the two extreme positions, there also exist multi-stage tests that have been 
fashioned in an abstracted form – on when refusals to grant access are abusive,152 or where selective 
distribution agreements are legal -153  thereby granting certainty to all businesses (albeit to a lesser 
extent than outright presumptions). In contrast to ad hoc findings of novel illegality, the clarity of 
these developed norms for all derives from their generalizations which structure and thereby restrain 
future Commission decision-making. How much more uncertain would EU competition law have 
been over the decades without such abstracted norms?154 But this, again, goes to their effectiveness as 
an enforcement tool. The Commission may wish to tackle a certain novel practice but not for its 
findings to be more broadly applied owing to, for instance, its widespread burden on businesses (e.g. 
“strategic underinvestment” as a theory of harm).155 The potential for unequal, subject- or industry-
specific normative acts through the unbounded discretion of commitment decisions thus amplifies 
their appeal for the Commission to realize its ends. Still, market intervention through individualized 
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appraisals of legality, contrary to the generalized norms envisaged by the rule of law, is a means of 
enforcement deleterious to realizing normative comprehensibility for businesses. 
The discretion for commitment decisions to reach conduct falling below high thresholds for 
illegality on a subject-specific basis also undermines systemic certainty. Where generalized norms of 
legality and illegality already exist, the Commission essentially uses Article 9 to create individual 
exceptions which fall short of authoritative thresholds for intervention deduced by the Courts. This 
has been particularly conspicuous in the energy sector. For example with regard to the doctrine of 
collective dominance, through a commitment decision the Commission can avoid the restraining 
influence of the stringent and generalized normative hurdles established in Airtours, thus reaching the 
same conclusion regardless in the individual circumstances of German Electricity via assertions and 
banal reflections on the structural characteristics of the particular market.156 The Commission has 
been open about using such decisions to create exceptions to the generalized, reasonably 
comprehensible elements of the Bronner test for abusive refusals of access. Rather than novel theories 
of harm, it has characterized capacity hoarding and strategic underinvestment as “sector specific” 
manifestations of constructive refusals to supply,157 though without having to rigorously meet the high 
thresholds for intervention set by the ECJ. So are these “sector specific” exceptions only applicable to 
energy companies? Other industries with bottlenecks? Or, as seems a simpler assumption, as and 
when the Commission sees fit in a commitment decision? By making such claims, the Commission is 
directly championing the use of its discretion to avoid the restraint of applying generalized, exacting 
tests for reaching certain legal conclusions, thereby undermining normative certainty for businesses. 
In short, commitment decisions facilitate deliberately discriminatory decision-making at the 
individual and industry level. 
The lack of clarity as to the divide between legality and illegality that results from the 
Commission’s absolute discretion in commitment decisions is also related to the far-reaching 
remedies negotiated. Traditional conceptualizations of the formal rule of law rarely engage with the 
consequences of a normative determination, focusing instead upon whether the outcome of decision-
making was reasonably comprehensible, which is more likely to be the case with the application of 
generalized norms rather than subject-specific analysis. The concern is usually with the predictability 
of a finding of illegality rather than resultant punishment.158 But commitment decisions blur the neat 
conceptual divide between legality and consequences; unlike the fines attached to a fully-
substantiated Article 7 prohibition decision, the remedial packages agreed in an Article 9 commitment 
decision are better considered conditions of legality. And as has been seen, the Commission has the 
discretion to secure all manner of far-reaching changes for the closure of its investigations. It has 
always maintained that remedial packages are offered by businesses of their own volition without any 
bargaining.159 There are good reasons to question this self-portrayal of the Commission neutrally 
encouraging commitments from investigated companies, eschewing messy negotiations and not 
applying pressure to settle.160  
But regardless of which side of the table is suggesting the remedies, it remains the case that 
there is no way of knowing in advance which changes will satiate the Commission’s concerns. To 
secure no further competition investigation going forward, companies have agreed to very severe 
conditions (e.g. divestiture), remedies contrary to their own national governments’ wishes (e.g. 
ownership unbundling of German energy infrastructure), or outcomes tenuously connected to the 
competitive concerns the Commission initially raised.161 But at the same time, there are occasions 
where the remedial discretion of commitment decisions has been utilized in a more restrained manner. 
In the E-Books and Amazon decisions concerning MFNs and the recently concluded Cross-Border 
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Access to Pay-TV investigations regarding absolute territorial protection, the offending contractual 
clauses were essentially removed. It is simply unclear whether the Commission expects such 
moderate alterations or something more radical. What complicates this further for investigated firms 
is that the Commission’s unbounded discretion to agree remedies also permits inconsistent outcomes. 
As CEZ demonstrates, even where commitment decisions on similar grounds have resulted in a 
particular type of remedy (the sale of reserved capacity),162 the Commission still has the discretion to 
acquire something else instead to close the investigation (generation divestiture).163  
The unpredictability of what will have to be offered to secure the Commission’s blessing is 
amplified by the ad hoc, industry- or firm-specific nature of some commitment remedies. If the 
Commission opens proceedings for suspected product bundling against a company that doesn’t 
produce the world’s largest computer operating system, what can it learn from Microsoft pleasing the 
Commission with a creative consumer ballot screen?164 What normative clarity can be derived from 
geographical discrimination being remedied by splitting the Swedish electricity market into two 
bidding zones for any business that is not a national transmission system operator?165 Will any other 
firm that engages in partitioning of the single market to extract excessive prices in particular Member 
States be expected to reorganize the delivery of gas in Central and Eastern Europe?166 Again, this goes 
to the connection between (i) generalized norms and (ii) comprehensible obligations for other firms 
that constitutes the formal rule of law ideal. When the remedies accepted in commitment decisions as, 
essentially, conditions of legality are so context-specific, they offer no indication to future firms as to 
what concessions they will be expected to make for the Commission to close its investigation. This is 
a recipe for the further proposal of disproportionate or disconnected remedies by businesses who lack 
a reliable comparator against which to calibrate their proposal. 
Taking all of these factors together, the hope or fear of commitment decisions crystallizing 
into a “shadow jurisprudence”, guiding businesses to a greater extent than the authoritative law 
deduced by the EU Courts from Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, is highly unlikely. Albeit an undeniably 
effective tool for realizing its policy goals, the Commission’s absolute discretion in commitment 
decisions is entirely unstructured by any generalized norms, including EU competition law. This 
means of enforcement makes it very difficult for businesses to comprehend when the Commission 
will intervene or what remedial concessions will be necessary for it to close the investigation. The ad 
hoc, subject-specific, inconsistent collection of commitment decisions constitutes a rag-bag of legal 
novelties, shallow characterizations falling short of rigorous judicially-determined thresholds, and 
particularistic remedial packages that cannot meaningfully inform broader business decision-making. 
As sections 2 and 3 demonstrated, the Commission’s discretion to investigate any conduct 
and secure any remedy has permitted the enforcement of its policy ends with maximum efficacy, 
often with substantial benefits for European consumers. But this means of market intervention is 
highly problematic. In freeing competition policy from the restraining influence of the authoritative, 
commonly generalized norms of law deduced by the Courts for determining the legality of business 
conduct, normative certainty is severely undermined. Through frequent recourse to commitment 
decisions, the virtues occasioned by realizing the rigidity and restraint of the formal rule of law ideal 
are sacrificed in the trade-off with policy effectiveness. 
6. Judicial Review: A Missed or Missing Opportunity?       
Despite the negative systemic consequences occasioned by contemporary divergence from the rule of 
law, the Commission’s persistence with commitment decisions for non-cartel investigations is 
thoroughly unsurprising. This is not just because administrative authorities can be expected to 
endeavour to realize as effectively as possible the various policies they believes to be in the general 
interest, even if via forms of enforcement antithetical to approximating the formal rule of law; if 
anything, one might question the convictions of an agency that didn’t constantly strive to push 
boundaries by whatever means necessary, thereby effectively delivering policy “goods”.  
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But rather than a common temptation, the prioritization of ends through broad discretionary 
decision-making by the Commission in the enforcement of competition law appears to be an 
expectation of the EU Treaties. As with overseeing privileges to services of general economic 
interest167 and state aid,168 Article 105 TFEU mandates the Commission to “ensure” the application of 
the vague prohibitions contained within Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. When it comes to the business 
practices listed therein, the language of the TFEU (“in particular”, “may… consist in”) clearly 
suggests that they are merely an indicative starting-point for market intervention. In essence, the 
institutional architecture erected by the Treaties is one of an activist Commission prioritizing the 
effective realization of EU policy through using its discretion to investigate any form of conduct it 
deems contrary to Articles 101 and 102. Whether via the specific route of commitments or prohibition 
decisions, unpredictable enforcement against novel practices on an ad hoc basis seems wired into the 
system. 
But still, the EU’s emphasis upon administrative discretion is predicated upon the opportunity 
for judicial scrutiny of whether individual decisions “fit” with the Courts’ own interpretation of the 
open-textured concepts of the EU Treaties. In any system emphasizing administrative enforcement, it 
is the possibility of judicial review that allows for the most unforeseeable, subject-specific first-
instance decision-making to still result in a legal order approximating normative comprehensibility 
and generality, i.e. the principles of the rule of law. Courts are a vital counterbalance to staccato 
enforcement by authorities. Judicial review is an opportunity to rule on the whether the specific 
finding of legality or illegality in an individual decision should be generalized, applicable to other 
subjects, and thereby clarify the legal obligations incumbent upon all. Each case can prospectively 
formulate and update the normative obligations of EU competition law deduced from the flexible 
Treaty prohibitions, thus structuring future decision-making by the Commission. As context-specific 
decisions with unclear legal implications can nevertheless be transformed into more abstracted and 
comprehensible norms, courts have a sizeable impact upon the extent to which the formal rule of law 
is realized in enforcement regimes which prioritize administrative decision-making. This includes EU 
competition law. 
Judicial review of commitment decisions concluded by the Commission has arguably not 
satisfied this role, but it may not be an oversight entirely of the Courts’ making. Although the ECJ 
missed an opportunity to provide some limit to the use of commitment decisions, it is not obvious 
what else could actually be done to restrain the Commission’s discretion, given that so few decisions 
are likely to appear before courts. 
Whenever judicial review is raised in the context of commitment decisions, the Alrosa saga 
invariably comes to mind, culminating in what has been labelled the “Worst Decision” of the ECJ.169 
The Courts were essentially called upon to either terminate or legitimate the extreme remedial 
discretion seen in Article 9 commitment decisions by ruling on whether they should be held to the 
same proportionality requirement as Article 7 prohibition decisions.170 The concept of proportionality 
is a general principle of EU law, holding that penalties and remedies ought to be suitable and the least 
onerous possible.171 The alleged disproportionality of remedies has often been the perspective from 
which the compliance of commitment decisions with the rule of law has been questioned.172 As 
mentioned previously, the General Court in Microsoft annulled part of the infringement decision 
owing to the monitoring trustee obligation,173 stressing that the Commission “does not have unlimited 
discretion when formulating remedies”.174 
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When asked in Alrosa whether the same limitation applied to Article 9 commitment 
decisions, the General Court answered in the affirmative, finding that the Commission could only 
secure the least onerous outcome that met its competitive concerns.175 Celebratory commentary 
ensued, welcoming that the Commission was forced to “respect the rule of law” and that “quasi-
regulatory solutions” in commitment decisions would end.176 This was short-lived. The ECJ 
overturned the ruling on appeal and rubber-stamped the Commission’s discretion through Article 9 to 
secure any outcome,177 so long as it only accepted the least onerous of the proposed remedial 
packages that it considered satisfactory.178 The Commission’s analysis of remedial proportionality in 
commitment decisions immediately became noticeably more scant.179 
The ECJ’s ruling in Alrosa is a striking example of judicial deference and has understandably 
been subjected to widespread criticism.180 The Court declined the opportunity to set a meaningful 
limit to the remedial discretion afforded to the Commission by commitment decisions. The sheer 
breadth of proposals that may be required for the Commission to deem market conduct safe from 
further investigation makes it difficult to know the scope of what should be offered. By using the 
concept of proportionality to hedge-in the extent of such discretion, the ECJ could have provided a 
greater degree of certainty for investigated companies. Furthermore, by actually establishing a direct 
link between the potential infringement under scrutiny and the outcomes of commitment decisions, 
the ECJ could have prevented those instances where commitment decisions have secured remedies 
seemingly disconnected from its initial competitive concerns. Instead, it chose not to take the 
opportunity to shift the use of commitment decisions towards the formal rule of law ideal. 
A similarly deferential approach towards remedies was more recently evident in the General 
Court’s Morningstar ruling,181 a review of the Reuters Instrument Codes commitment decision.182 
Essentially, the challenge was that the Commission had concluded a remedial package which wasn’t 
strong enough to address its competitive concerns, and should have included more exacting 
requirements to make it even easier for customers to switch real-time datafeed services.183 The 
General Court rejected the claim that there had been a manifest error of assessment, finding that the 
package concluded was sufficient to meet initial concerns that customers should be able to more 
easily change provider; the Court agreed that the remedial package met this relative desire.184 Its role 
was to look at the Commission’s competition worries and the remedies, not “the demands put forward 
by competitors” in relation to their content.185 To that end, it didn’t matter that remedies 
comparatively even more favourable to competition could have been agreed,186 or that since the 
decision no user had switched away from Reuters.187 The situation following Alrosa and Morningstar 
is therefore that the EU Courts are reluctant to incisively weigh-in on the remedies accepted in 
commitment decisions, whether to question their gravity or levity, so long as they are the least 
intrusive suitable commitments offered by the parties. 
But having noted the Courts’ failure to set meaningful boundaries to the Commission’s 
remedial discretion in commitment decisions, it is worth questioning whether more searching 
oversight would really solve the severe divergence from realizing the formal rule of law. This is for 
two reasons.  
First, disproportionate commitments are only the tip of the iceberg. As argued in section 5, 
the problems with the means of market intervention constituting commitment decisions go beyond the 
                                                     
175 T-170/06, Alrosa Company Ltd. v. Commission, EU:T:2007:220, paras. 92-111. 
176 Siragusa and Guerri, “Antitrust Settlements under EC Competition Law: The Point of View of Defendants” in Ehlermann 
and Marquis, supra note 104, pp. 202. See also: Schweitzer, supra note 106, pp. 568-569; Forrester, supra note 104, pp. 651. 
177 C-441/07 P, Alrosa, EU:C:2010:377. 
178 The rational course of action for investigated firms is to adopt “salami tactics” to cover the “entire spectrum of adequate 
remedies”: Wagner-Von Papp, supra note 20, 937-938. Similarly Messina and Ho, supra note 170, 747. 
179 Wagner-Von Papp, ibid., 942-943. 
180 E.g. Cengiz, supra note 23, 150-151; Wagner-Von Papp, ibid., 967-968; Botteman and Patsa, supra note 137, 369; Jenny, 
supra note 19.  
181 T-76/12, Morningstar Inc., v. Commission, EU:T:2016:481. 
182 Reuters Instrument Codes (RICs) (COMP/39.654). 
183 T-76/12, Morningstar, paras. 47-48. As a rival datafeed producer, Morningstar would benefit from easier switching.  
184 Ibid., paras. 61-74.  
185 Ibid., para. 57.  
186 Ibid., para. 59. 
187 Ibid., para. 73. 
 21 
foreseeability of the Commission’s exercise of its remedial discretion. That legality is conditional 
upon unknowable concessions is only one element in a phenomenon with complex implications for 
normative comprehensibility; remedial proportionality would not have touched upon the undesirable 
consequences of enforcement against business conduct beyond and below the pre-existing norms of 
EU competition law. Put differently, commitment decisions predicated upon novel theories of harm 
but where the Commission’s remedial discretion is exercised in a more restrained fashion (e.g. E-
Books, Amazon) still foster legal uncertainty, but owing to issues unrelated to their actual outcomes. 
In contrast, the pending Groupe Canal judgment offers an opportunity for the ECJ to address 
other problematic divergences from the formal rule of law which have hitherto fallen outside the 
scope of review.188 Unlike Alrosa and Morningstar which primarily focused upon remedies, Groupe 
Canal relates to the potential illegality forming the subject-matter of the investigation. The 
Commission’s treatment of absolute territorial protection in copyright licensing agreements in Pay-TV 
is arguably an expansion of the pre-existing scope of the Article 101(1) TFEU prohibition. In Coditel 
II, the ECJ ruled that copyright licences partitioning Europe along national lines for both active and 
passive broadcasts were not necessarily a restriction by object owing to the idiosyncrasies of the 
cinematographic industry and copyright as a form of IP.189 Although Coditel II is acknowledged in 
both of the Pay-TV commitment decisions,190 the Commission ultimately found that licences granting 
strict absolute territorial protection for films frustrate market integration and eliminate cross-border 
broadcasts. It primarily relied instead upon the ECJ’s ruling in Murphy which concerned exclusivity 
contracts with obligations not to supply decoding devices allowing access to matches broadcast in 
other Member States.191 Unlike Coditel II, preventing the circulation of such devices was found to  
violate Article 101 TFEU.192 However, as Ibáñez Colomo has suggested,193 Murphy was 
distinguishable from Coditel II: the ECJ stressed that copyright was not in play in Murphy as football 
matches cannot be classed as original works under EU legislation,194 and therefore that its main 
competition law concerns were the supplemental contractual obligations preventing cross-border trade 
in the physical devices themselves.195 With this in mind, it is not clear whether Murphy is the 
appropriate precedent for the Pay-TV commitment decisions as the Commission’s citations therein 
suggest, or whether its approach to geo-blocking has reached some way beyond the ECJ’s treatment 
of more analogous restrictions in Coditel II. The General Court doesn’t seem to think so, issuing a 
judgment which mirrors the Commission’s reasoning in Paramount, and that has since been added to 
the footnotes of the other Pay-TV commitments alongside Murphy. On further appeal, the ECJ may 
well agree with the Commission’s analysis, thereby minimizing the scope of the Coditel exception 
which offered a legal shelter for absolute territorial protection in copyright licensing agreements. But 
this is why an authoritative ruling by the EU Courts on the law deduced from Article 101 TFEU is so 
important for the normative comprehensibility of competition policy: absent such a judicial statement, 
copyright licensors and licensees would be faced on the one hand with the complex case law of 
Coditel and Murphy, and on the other with the broader, seemingly inconsistent enforcement activity 
through the Pay-TV commitment decisions. Even if the ECJ were to simply rubber-stamp Paramount, 
authoritative judicial approval itself of the scope of the Article 101 TFEU prohibition is valuable for 
promoting legal certainty. 
But the opportunity in Groupe Canal to better realize the formal rule of law simultaneously 
stresses what is the real problem with judicial review of commitment decisions. If anything, 
fascination with the Courts’ standard of review is a distraction. The ECJ’s finding in Alrosa may have 
been a missed opportunity for curtailing remedial discretion, but a second reason to be somewhat 
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more forgiving of the Courts – and concerned for the realization of the rule of law - is that judicial 
oversight is generally a missing opportunity. Given the rise of commitment decisions as a tool for EU 
competition enforcement, it is astounding that judicial engagements have been so infrequent: Repsol 
in Transportes Evaristo Molina and more recently in the Gasorba preliminary reference;196 De Beers 
in Alrosa;197 Reuters Instrument Codes in Morningstar;198 and now Paramount (and indirectly Pay-
TV) in Groupe Canal.199 Furthermore, although the latter directly engages with the legal issues of the 
conduct deemed problematic by the Commission, Alrosa and Morningstar primarily focused on the 
nature of the remedies agreed, and both engagements with Repsol raised purely procedural issues.200 
Despite the possibility for the Courts to alleviate the ad hoc, subject-specific, widely 
incomprehensible and legally unauthoritative nature of commitment decisions, a major problem is that 
this form of enforcement leaves few opportunities for judicial review.201 The much maligned Alrosa is 
almost a decade old and perhaps in Groupe Canal the ECJ will more incisively review preliminary 
legal analysis within commitment decisions. But will it really make a difference in practice, paving 
the way towards approximating the formal rule of law? Regardless of the intensity of judicial scrutiny 
exercised by the ECJ, instances for the Courts to structure the Commission’s discretion and afford 
greater normative clarity to businesses are simply few and far between. Having made the strategic 
decision to agree a remedial package with the Commission for reasons of time, cost, reputational 
damage etc., it makes little sense for the investigated undertaking to then launch judicial review 
proceedings of it.202 This contrasts with experience under the regime prior to Regulation 1/2003. Even 
parties whose agreements were granted an individual exemption pursuant to Article 101(3) TFEU 
would frequently challenge before the Courts their alleged contravention of paragraph 1 or the 
conditions imposed,203 sometimes successfully.204 Furthermore, exemption decisions were subjected 
to routine scrutiny by EU Courts at the behest of third parties.205 One possible explanation for few 
reviews of commitment decisions launched by other firms may be the Commission’s discretion to 
very effectively counter practices beyond and below the pre-existing scope of the law, commonly with 
substantial remedial packages. Such frequently severe outcomes present very different circumstances 
to the pre-modernization suspicion that, in granting an exemption decision, the Commission had 
exercised leniency. As vividly demonstrated by Metro’s repeated challenges to Commission findings 
of inapplicability and exemption for SABA’s selective distribution arrangements,206 feelings of light-
touch competition enforcement were a catalyst for disgruntled competitors and trading partners to 
initiate proceedings in Luxembourg. Although the small number of challenges indicate that similar 
third party motives can still arise, businesses close to a firm subjected to a commitment decision 
would probably feel overjoyed with their use by the Commission rather than litigious. Another reason 
may be that the Commission does not reach a formal conclusion on the illegality of the conduct 
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investigated, instead providing a preliminary assessment of its competitive concerns. This might lead 
third parties to question the strength of their legal challenge to commitments. But the veracity of such 
explanations for third party inertia can only be substantiated through further investigation.   
To summarize, the unlikelihood of judicial review ensures that the Commission’s 
discretionary enforcement of EU competition policy through commitment decisions remains absolute. 
There are few chances for the Courts to address the divergence occasioned from the formal rule of law 
ideal, offering authoritative interpretations of the Treaty, facilitating normative certainty, and 
transforming ad hoc, subject-specific determinations into generalized norms. Groupe Canal is a rare 
exception, offering some increase in legal clarity even if the ECJ follows the GC’s lead in 
rubberstamping the somewhat inconclusive use of Coditel II and Murphy by the Commission. But it 
doesn’t solve the practical problem of missing opportunities for judicial engagement with 
commitment decisions.  
Serious questions must be asked as to how the EU Courts can better fulfil their role envisaged 
under the formal rule of law ideal, minimizing the undesirable implications of the discretionary means 
of commitment decisions. There are a number of possible proposals. The purpose is not to explore all 
the options in minute detail to find the one perfect solution, but to lay the initial groundwork for a 
necessary debate in the future on how to give EU Courts more oversight of commitment decisions.  
The first options is reversing Alrosa and Morningstar by increasing the intensity of review 
over the proportionality of remedies. This can be quickly dismissed. As already argued, such a change 
only scratches at the surface of the problems posed by commitment decision. The preceding analysis 
of enforcement reaching conduct beyond and below the pre-existing law also fosters considerable 
issues for legal certainty in EU competition law. These would not be addressed through remedial 
proportionality alone. Nor would it resolve the dearth of commitment decisions before the Courts. 
Second, the Commission could be required to bring concurrent Article 7 prohibition and 
Article 9 commitment decisions when it is pursuing unprecedented business conduct and proposing a 
novel theory of harm. There would thus be at least one fully-reasoned decision for businesses to 
internalize and which may be reviewed by the EU Courts, thereby offering the opportunity for an 
authoritative ruling on the scope of competition law and, if necessary, generalization into more 
broadly applicable norms. An example of this occurred with the Motorola prohibition decision and 
Samsung commitment decision,207 a process praised by Whish.208 The problem is whether two similar 
investigations concerning novel business conduct are likely to arise at the same time. Where were the 
possible prohibition decision partners to Rambus on patent ambush, E-Books on MFNs, or the aborted 
Google Search commitments? As argued previously, many of these decisions where highly context-, 
industry-, or firm-specific, making a second instance ripe for a prohibition decision somewhat wishful 
thinking. Double decision-making would also entirely remove the impetus for commitment decisions: 
procedural efficiency. Furthermore, as Motorola itself demonstrates, having a simultaneous 
prohibition decision does not guarantee subsequent judicial review.         
Third, it has been suggested that investigated firms could more effectively constrain the 
Commission’s discretion in commitment decisions by forcing novel or weak investigations into a 
fully-substantiated prohibition decision and pursuing judicial review, thus authoritatively clarifying 
the reach of EU competition law.209 There are a couple of reasons to question this recommendation. 
First, commitment decisions are not an inherently problematic form of enforcement. Where the theory 
of harm is well-established in the case law and the remedial package concluded is not far-reaching, 
they can indeed be an effective means for both the Commission and investigated firms to conserve 
resources. The fact that such a method of decision-making considerably predates Regulation 1/2003 is 
a testament to the long-recognized capacity for mutual benefit. The problematic consequences from 
the perspective of the formal rule of law concern the wrong types of investigations being concluded in 
this fashion (e.g. novel or controversial conduct, unrelated remedies). The second reason for caution is 
a simple question: why aren’t investigated firms forcing the Commission into a fully-substantiated 
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prohibition decision and judicial review already? There is no clear answer to this,210 though the 
incentives to accept even the most problematic commitment decisions – money, time, reputation, 
future relations with the Commission – are obvious, especially where the legality of conduct is 
borderline, but even when it might be found legal.211 This one-to-one calculation in commitment 
decisions does not take into account the systemic degradation in the normative comprehensibility of 
EU competition enforcement. But although tinkering with investigated firms’ incentives to commit 
could theoretically alter the calculation of how they proceed, the actual changes necessary are not 
obvious. Should prohibition decisions be made more appealing through, for instance, scaling back the 
level of fines? Or should commitment decisions be made less appealing for businesses, which would 
risk losing the procedural efficiencies occasioned through the closure of legally and remedially 
uncontroversial decisions? 
The clearest means to transform context-specific commitment decisions with novel theories of 
harm and far-reaching remedies into more generalised, comprehensible legal norms is to embrace the 
role of courts in gradually approximating the formal rule of law. Commitment decisions concluded by 
the Commission could automatically be subject to judicial review before the EU Courts,212 
guaranteeing an opportunity for rulings on how the individual decision fits – or doesn’t - with the  
norms of EU competition law deduced from the Treaties. This would be closer to the process for 
consent decrees in the US, whereby the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice must secure 
judicial approval that settlements concluded with investigated firms are in the public interest.213 But it 
would not be identical: the commitment decision concluded by the Commission would still have to be 
legally binding on the investigated firm before judicial oversight (rather than authorization) was 
undertaken to avoid EU jurisdictional limits to the review of preparatory acts.214 As with prohibition 
decisions stretching the scope of Articles 101(1) and 102 TFEU, it may well be the case that the EU 
Courts simply agree with the new theories of harm pursued by the Commission.215 But even routine 
light-touch scrutiny of commitment decisions would nevertheless address the currently missing 
opportunities for oversight, allowing for authoritative judicial clarification of the scope of EU 
competition law. As envisaged by the formal rule of law ideal, it would provide chances for the 
Courts to generalize any ad hoc, subject-specific decision-making, thus further improving normative 
certainty for all businesses.  
Although arguably the most effective means to remedy the problems arising from the 
Commission’s use of commitment decisions, automatic judicial review could clearly raise a plethora 
of practical problems. In 2018 there were over 1000 cases pending at both the ECJ and General 
Court,216 but given how few commitment decisions are concluded by the Commission, there is little 
reason to believe that this would significantly affect the already bloated dockets in Luxembourg. 
Necessitating judicial oversight would surely have an effect upon the procedural efficiency of 
commitment decisions as an enforcement tool, increasing the time, cost, and uncertainty of 
concluding them. Still, mitigating solutions can be envisaged. The Preliminary Report of the allocated 
Judge-Rapporteur217 could be an opportunity to quickly filter-out commitment decisions grounded on 
recognized legally-problematic conduct and with simple remedies, reserving only the more 
concerning decisions highlighted in this piece for full judicial consideration. But even if greater 
scrutiny were deemed necessary to clarify and generalize decisions, would the Courts be able to 
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meaningfully engage with the Commission’s preliminary assessments, indicative of competition 
concerns but not actual violations of Articles 101 and 102? There is a risk that judicial insistence upon 
fuller reasoning by the Commission would degrade the efficiency of commitment decisions, raising 
the standard of proof and reasoning to that of a full prohibition decision. This would have to be 
avoided to ensure that time and cost savings are not unintentionally lost for legally innocuous and 
remedially conservative commitment decisions, which do not detract from the formal rule of law. 
But the most substantial hurdle to compulsory judicial engagement with commitment 
decisions is conceptual. Putting to one side any changes to the procedural rules of the Courts and 
maybe even the EU Treaties, this solution would mark a fundamental divergence from the 
constitutional choices underpinning the institutional architecture of EU competition enforcement. As 
this section began by explaining, the general division of labour within the EU gives priority to 
administrative decision-making by the Commission, subject to the potential for judicial review by the 
Courts of the legality of decisions. The exceptional, as-necessary nature of judicial review, affording 
latitude for the Commission to enforce the vague prohibitions of Articles 101 and 102, has been in 
place since the Treaty of Rome. Even before that, the prioritization of independent administrative 
decision-making may be part of the Ordoliberal legacy on European thinking about competition 
enforcement.218 Specifically mandating judicial review by EU Courts of commitment decisions 
concluded by the Commission would be an unprecedented break with this tradition. But if the 
systemic damage to normative certainty occasioned by the current use of such decisions is to be 
addressed, and if the formal rule of law ideal is to be better realized in contemporary EU competition 
enforcement, fundamental reorientation of long-held institutional principles may be the only way 
forward.     
 
7. Conclusion 
The meteoric rise of commitment decisions as a procedure for closing non-cartel competition 
investigations comes down to their undeniable appeal, which would surely be recognized by any 
administrative authority. They afford the Commission the unbridled discretion to pursue its policy 
goals with utmost efficacy, through addressing conduct beyond and below the pre-existing reach of 
EU competition law, and concluding ambitious remedial packages. This article has argued that such a 
form of market intervention is not without its consequences. The current use of commitment decisions 
is entirely at odds with approximating the politically and economically valuable ideal of the formal 
rule of law. Enforcement in the form of ad hoc, subject-specific decisions without any discernible 
generalized norms to structure future determinations has undermined the systematic legal certainty of 
EU competition law, as authoritatively deduced by the Courts from Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. 
Although at times embroiled in missed opportunities to rein-in the Commission’s discretion, the 
broader issue is arguably that judicial review of commitment decisions represents a missing 
opportunity. In the absence of private attorneys-general proactively dragging problematic decisions 
before the EU Courts, it may be necessary to obligate judicial scrutiny of commitments. This change 
would certainty require a fundamental recalibration of long-held ideas about the appropriate 
relationship between administrative decision-making and judicial review in Europe. But perhaps only 
then would a more balanced reconciliation of policy effectiveness and approximating the formal rule 
of law, of ends and means, be discernible in contemporary EU competition enforcement. In this 
important field of European activity, the Art. 2 TEU declaration of a Union founded upon the rule of 
law would not ring as hollow. 
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